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The Supreme Court stated that it was unnecessary for the purposes of the case to decide whether a state could constitutionally
adopt a procedure whereby the absent parties would be bound in a
suit involving merely a common question of law or fact.
CONCLUSION

At the present time there is a need to re-evaluate Florida Rule 3.6.
The rule has been applied equally to allow class suits (1) when the
individual rights are joint or common and (2) when the rights are
several but there is a common question of law or fact. The Florida
Court has held the judgment to be binding in both cases, but it is
not clear that it would allow a class suit in the latter case now.
In any event, in the light of the Hansberry dictum and the conflicting cases on the subject,4 7 the class suit should be limited to those
cases in which the interest is joint or common, or a suitable procedure
for satisfying due process as to absent parties should be established.
HARRY G. CARRAr

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE NATO STATUS
OF FORCES AGREEMENT
A United States citizen who enters a foreign country by the mere
fact of doing so subjects himself to the laws of that country and to the
possibility of civil and criminal prosecution in its courts. Is the same
true of an American soldier on duty in a friendly foreign country? Can
he be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court that may not safeguard
the rights guaranteed him under the American system of jurisprudence?
Considering the fact that there are at present United States armed
forces in over ten foreign countries,' it may be well to understand the
legal status of these forces.
Most American troops overseas are in nations that are members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This note deals with the
criminal jurisdiction of the NATO countries over friendly foreign
47

Compare Allen v. Avondale Co., 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938), with Hintze v.
Allen, 326 Ill. App. 182, 61 N.E2d 259 (1945); Central Mexico Light & Power Co.
v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1940) (dictum).
'Supplementary Hearing Before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate,
83 Cong., Ist Sess. (1953).
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troops within their borders. That jurisdiction is largely governed by
the recent NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement 2 is an attempt to fix the
legal relations of NATO forces, civilian components, and dependents
stationed in foreign NATO countries. It deals with entry and departure of personnel, criminal jurisdiction, claims between nations, trade,
taxation, import-export duties, and numerous minor incidents of the
operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Article VII, the
criminal jurisdiction provision, has been the subject of much debate,
congressional and otherwise, 3 both before and after it became binding
upon the United States in 1958. The opposing attitudes toward foreign
policy reflected in the controversy are, on the one hand, that the
United States, as the dominant power of NATO and the protector of
western Europe, is behaving in an unduly obsequious manner in4
placing its citizens at the disposal of the courts of its NATO brethren;
and, on the other hand, that the primary purpose of United States
troops in Europe is the protection of the United States and, even
granting the agreement to be a cession of sovereignty, it is better to
cede some sovereignty than to risk ceding Europe by dissolution of
NATO and withdrawal of the United States forces. 5
Article VII provides that each state shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses violative only of its laws committed by persons subject to
the military law of a sending state. When the laws of both states are
violated, jurisdiction is concurrent. The sending state has primary
jurisdiction if the offense is against its property or personnel, or committed while the offender is on duty; otherwise, primary jurisdiction
is in the receiving state. An accused may, however, be tried by the
2Aug. 23, 1953, T.IA.S. No. 2846.
SSee Hearings Before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, 83d Cong.,

Ist Sess. (1953); 99

CONG.

Rrc. 4818 (daily ed. May 7, 1953); Supplementary Hearing

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 83d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1953); 99 CONG. REc. 9024, 9086 (daily ed. July 14, 1953); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to Review the Operation of
Article VII of the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); Hearings Before
the Committee on ForeignAffairs of the House, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. RE.z.
No. 1268, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955); 15 J.A. JOUR. 1 (Oct. 1953); 18 J.A. JoUR. 15

(Oct. 1954).
4Bennett and Van Kirk, Tyranny by Treaty, 20 J.A. JouR. 8 (July 1955); Bricker,
Safeguarding the Rights of American Servicemen Abroad, 15 J.A. JoUFL 1 (Oct.

1953).
5See 18 J.A. Jotm. 15 (Oct. 1954).
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sending state for breach of its military discipline after having been
tried by the receiving state for violation of the latter's laws. Either
state may waive primary jurisdiction and must give sympathetic consideration to a request for waiver from the state having concurrent
jurisdiction.
OBJECnONS
The objections to article VII from United States sources are made
on two grounds: (1) it violates the Federal Constitution, in that certain procedural rights guaranteed as due process of law by the Bill
of Rights are not contained in the Status of Forces Agreement or upheld by the legal systems of all the NATO countries; (2) it gives away
sovereignty that would otherwise be this nation's by operation of international law in the absence of agreement.
Due Process
Section 9 entitles one tried under article VII by a receiving state
to the following: (1) prompt trial, (2) presentation of charges prior to
trial, (3) confrontation of witnesses, (4) compulsory process to obtain
witnesses within the receiving state, (5) legal representation, (6) a
competent interpreter, and (7) communication with a representative of
his own government. Rights not secured by the agreement or by the
internal laws of some NATO countries include rights to jury trial, bail,
presumption of innocence, public trial, and exemption from cruel and
unusual punishments. 6
Objection on the due process basis is somewhat weakened by the
fact that persons subject to United States military law do not have
all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution even when tried by
American military courts. 7
The question of the constitutionality of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, or of any treaty made under the authority of the United
States, is, from the standpoint of precedent, largely academic; no
United States treaty or treaty provision has ever been held unconstitutional.8 There are dicta, however, to the effect that a treaty
could be invalidated if constitutional limitations on the treaty making
power were transcended.9
6See T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (1953).
7E.g., there is no right to jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
SSVARLIEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 266 (1955).
9E.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
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Cession of Sovereignty
International law, as set forth in the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court, does not dearly define the extent of jurisdiction of a
nation over its troops stationed abroad in peacetime. Thus there is
no definite answer to the question of whether a signatory power of the
Status of Forces treaty is yielding sovereignty.
The leading American case on the subject is Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon.0 This was an action to replevy a ship that, since
leaving the possession of plaintiffs, had become a public vessel of
France; at the time of suit it was moored in a Philadelphia harbor.
In holding that United States courts did not have jurisdiction over a
public vessel of a friendly foreign nation, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"A third case in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of
his territorial jurisdiction is, where he allows the troops of a foreign
prince to pass through his dominions."" These words have been
subject to at least four interpretations.
(1) Since the case involved the immunity of a foreign public
ship in a United States harbor and not that of a member of
of a foreign military force, the statement is mere dictum
and has little weight in determining status of forces.12
(2) The statement is the major premise for the holding of the
case; foreign troops have complete immunity, and the foreign ship's immunity is found by analogy.'3
(3)Immunity from the foreign sovereign's jurisdiction is
granted only to troops passing through a foreign land and
not to those permanently stationed there.14
(4) A host sovereign cedes only that portion of his jurisdiction
that might hinder the maintenance of the force as a fighting unit; otherwise it retains jurisdiction over that force.' 5
Three subsequent United States Supreme Court cases have expanded
416, 433 (1920); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Iannone v. Radory
Constr. Corp., 285 App. Div. 751, 141 N.Y.S.2d 311, 315 (3d Dep't 1955).
1011 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
1"Id. at 139.
1299 CONG. REc. 9063 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
1399 CONG. Rac. 4819 (daily ed. May 7, 1953).
1499 CONG. REc. 9034 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).

15Wright v. Cantrell, 1943-45 Annual Digest and Reports of'Public International
Law Cases [hereinafter cited as Ann. Dig.] 133 (Sup. Ct. New South Wales).
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the original statement by Chief Justice Marshall, but in each case by
dictum. 16
Decisions of the courts of Australia, Brazil, and Egypt 7 uphold
the exemption of foreign forces from local jurisdiction when the
exercise of that jurisdiction would inhibit the functioning of those
forces, or at least when the offense is committed on the post where the
forces are stationed or by a member of the forces acting under orders.
A series of Egyptian cases' s follows the policy set out by the Institute
of International Law that sailors committing offenses on shore in a
friendly foreign nation and regaining their ship before being apprehended may be tried by their superiors or by other courts of the flag
state. The same rule has been held to apply to soldiers who leave
their military quarters but return before being arrested. One Italian
and one Greek case hold that an army carries with it complete sovereignty and is not subject to the jurisdiction of any other nation.19
British wartime legislation gave American military courts exclusive
jurisdiction over American troops in England,20 but this was called by
then Foreign secretary Eden" "'a very considerable departure.., from
the traditional system and practice of the United Kingdom.' "21 Partly
reciprocating for the British concession, the United States in 1944
enacted the Service Courts of Friendly Foreign Forces Act.22 This act
granted jurisdiction to the military courts of friendly nations with
troops stationed on American soil. It has been cited to support both
sides of the argument as to whether United States policy favors immunity of friendly forces in a foreign land. One side argues that it
was merely the implementation of a policy always observed.23 The
other replies that it was legislation necessary to give foreign service
courts jurisdiction24 that would otherwise be exercised by courts of
the United States.
16Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 433 (1902); Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158,
165 (1879); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 515 (1878).
"I1n re Gilbert, 1946 Ann. Dig. 86 (Sup. Fed. Ct. Brazil); Amrane v. John, 1931-32
Ann. Dig. 174 (Div. Trib. Alexandria, Egypt); Wright v. Cantrell, supra note 5.
IsSee, e.g., Anne v. Ministere Public, 1943-45 Ann. Dig. 115 (Ct. Cassation);
Ministere Public v. Korakis, 1943-45 Ann. Dig. 120 (Ct. Cassation); Orfanidis v.
Ministere Public, 1943-45 Ann. Dig. 141 (Mixed Ct. Cassation).
'91n re A. F., 1943-45 Ann. Dig. 163 (Tribunal Correctionnel, Isle of Chios);
In re Polimeni, 1935-37 Ann. Dig. 248 (Military Ct. of Rome).
2oUnited States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, 5 & 6 GEo. 6, c. 31.
2199 CONG. Rac. 9064 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
2222 U.S.C. §§701-06.
2399 CONG. REc. 9054 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
2499 CONG. Rac. 9066 (daily ed. July 14, 195A).
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ARTICLE VII iN OPERATION

The NATO Status of Forces Agreement was ratified by the United
States Senate on July 15, 1953,25 with a reservation appended.26 The
reservation provides:
(1) Article VII does not constitute a precedent for future agreements.
(2) When a person subject to United States military law is to be
tried by another NATO nation, the commander of United
States forces in that nation is to examine the laws of that
country to ascertain whether rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution are also guaranteed by those
laws.
(3) If those rights are not so guaranteed, the host nation shall
be requested to waive its jurisdiction according to the provisions of article VII.
(4) If waiver is not granted, the commander shall ask the
United States Department of State "to press such request
through diplomatic channels," notification being given to
the Armed Services Committees of both houses of the
United States Congress.
(5) A United States observer is to be present at all trials of
Americans by foreign NATO nations under article VII to
report to the United States commander in the receiving state
any violation of the provisions of section 9.
Pursuant to this reservation, a request for waiver of jurisdiction has
been made in every case in which this request was "consistent with our
27
overall relations with the host state."
Rrc. 9088 (daily ed. July 15, 1953).
CoNG. R.Ec. 9080 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
2rHearingsBefore a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
to Review the Operation of Article VII of the Agreement Between the Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 84th Cong., Ist
Sess. 10 (1955). A survey made during the period from Dec. 1, 1953, to Nov. 30, 1954,
of cases in which a foreign state had jurisdiction of persons subject to United States
military law shows the following figures in regard to NATO SOF signatories:
2599 CONG.
2899

offenses subject to jurisdiction, 3,450; waivers granted, 2,335; cases dropped, 110;
cases tried, 815; acquittals, 72; fine or reprimand, 653; confinement suspended, 46;

confinement imposed, 44; pending, 218. S. REP. No. 1268, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1955).
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Reports of American commanders in countries that have ratified
the Status of Forces Agreement indicate that the agreement has no
adverse effect on the morale or efficiency of their forces, 2s except in
Turkey, where the customary delays of judicial process reportedly
have caused resentment on the part of troops stationed there. A report
of the Senate Armed Services Committee 29 states that the agreement
is working satisfactorily and praises the co-operative attitude with
which its purposes are being carried out in most cases.
CONCLUSION

The existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization presupposes a unity of effort and objective among the member nations.
Conflicting jurisdictional agreements would burden this unity; erasing
all such agreements and leaving jurisdictional problems to the anarchical concept that sovereign nations are subject to no laws but their
own would make unity virtually impossible.
The permanent quartering of foreign troops in any country is
bound to cause friction. The Status of Forces Agreement, article VII
in particular, seeks to reduce this friction by sanctioning the rights of
both host and guest and putting them in a status of equality. The
English or American lawyer may well object that article VII fails to
guarantee certain procedural rights that he considers fundamental.
The only answer to this objection is that the rights that are guaranteed constitute a ground common to the legal systems of most of the
signatory nations and that to inject into the agreement the doctrines
of one system to the exclusion of those of another would only achieve
discord where harmony is sought.
JACK W. BELT

2

sSee Hearings,supra note 27, at 27-31.
REP. No. 1268, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955).

29S.
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